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It's a (Two-)Culture Thing: The Lateral
Shift to Liberation
Barry Kew

F

rom an acute and, some will argue, a harsh,
a harsh, fantastic or even tactically naive
naive perspective, this article examines
examines animal liberation, vegetarianism
vegetarianism and veganism in relation to a
bloodless culture ideal. It suggests that the
movement's repeated anomalies, denial of heritage,
privileging of vegetarianism, and other concessions
to bloody culture, restrict rather than liberate the
full subversionary and revelatory potential of
liberationist discourse, and with representation and
strategy implications.
‘Only the profoundest cultural needs … initially caused adult man [sic] to
continue to drink cow milk through life’. 1
In The Social Construction of Nature, Klaus Eder develops a useful concept
of two cultures - the bloody and the bloodless. He understands the
ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as resulting
from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the
‘bloodless’ tradition from within Judaism and the ‘bloody’ tradition of
ancient Greece.
In Genesis, killing entered the world after the fall from grace and
initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system of food taboos
regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in
Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This
‘civilizing’ process replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of

Calvin. W. Schwabe, ‘Animals in the Ancient World’ in Aubrey Manning and James
Serpell, (eds), Animals and Human Society: Changing Perspectives (Routledge, London,
1994), p.54.

1

1

Animal Issues, Vol 4, No. 1, 2000

human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and
these by money paid to the sacrificial priests. 2
Modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish
tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different
traditional evolutionary line which emerges from the Greek polis. This
ritual ‘civilized’ the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the
Jewish tradition. It did not abolish them but retained them instead as a
sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other
groups who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into
question. 3 The dominant modern cultural code continues this older
tradition, the bloody culture of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the
fundamental distance from the state of nature. 4 It is the co-existence of
these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens
two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern society. 5
We shall borrow the two culture concept and use it as a structuring
device for our own purposes and, although we shall not be clinging to
Eder's thesis, we shall draw upon it. 6 Here we shall be assuming that
animal liberation both constitutes and aims at the transformation of
bloody into bloodless culture, at least in the most propitious conditions
of the Western world initially. As representative of animal liberation we
shall take first the most often quoted works of three of the movement's
foremost philosophers - Peter Singer, Stephen Clark and Tom Regan but we shall not offer critiques of their use of the philosophical traditions
out of which they come, or indeed of the traditions themselves. 7 Instead,
and in a rather severe textual reading, we shall question animal
liberation in relation to the two cultures. To start, we shall measure the
canonical works against the slavery analogy, drawn by animal
2 Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological Enlightenment
(Sage, London, 1996), p.125.
3 Ibid., p.126.
4 Ibid., pp.129-130.
5 Ibid., p.132.
6 Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and bloodless-vegetarian
cultures throughout, for Eder depicts ecological reason as vegetarian culture when the
ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) whilst animal
liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). Eder also tends to run animals and
nature together, and views animal liberation almost wholly in utilitarianist terms.
Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous culture as a development of bloody
culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we shall use carnivorous and
bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless.
7 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals , 1975
(Avon, New York, 1977); Stephen R. L. Clark, The Moral Status of Animals , 1977
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984); Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983
(Routledge, London, 1988).
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advocates for centuries, which will allow us to explore statements of
animal liberation intent and therefore gain clues as to its ‘culture’ status,
which will then be examined against a different model. We shall finally
be able to suggest certain implications of the findings.

The Slavery Analogy
In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken
public consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the
animal liberation movement uses several parallels, and abolitionism
seems to be the most pertinent. Black peoples and other Others under
slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable
(and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a
respectable economic system. The systematic atrocities of human
slavery bear striking resemblance to the concept and practices of
institutionalized animal use and continuities are identifiable. 8 Moreover,
both animal use and human slavery have been considered at various
times synonymous with the process of civilizing and the progress of
civilization.
Let us assume the case then, acknowledging that there will always be
exceptional, extraordinary and non-representative situations to which
no philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to
assume, as the philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute
inviolability of all animal life). Let us assume that an animal liberation
case could be made out, declaring that, à la the abolitionist case, humans
should not deliberately use nonhumans for any non-symbolic purpose
(except perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in
any material way in order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of
the abolitionists was abolition, not kinder treatment, better conditions,
longer chains, fewer slaves, gentle usage or a different kind of slavery.
Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world (or
most of it) came to agree or to see the wrong and put an end to it. How
do the philosophers’ prescriptions stand in relation to this abolitionism?
Not full square.
Clark's promotion of anti-vivisection, for instance, is qualified by talk of
abolishing ‘most’ biomedical research on animals, 9 without saying what
Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989) pp.1-2; Marjorie Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and
Animal Slavery (Heretic Books, London, 1988).
9 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.xiii.
8
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should be left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan
appears to be quite straightforward in his demands - for vegetarianism,
anti-vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping - his idea that it is
‘commercial’ animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one
considering what ‘non-commercial’ animal agriculture is envisaged as
acceptable within his rights theory. 10 As he implies, no animal-product
system is viable in the long term without routine mutilation and
slaughter, a similar point made in relation to suffering by Singer who
calls for an end to the use of animals in trivial experiments whilst the
suffering in non-trivial research can continue until alternative methods
are found. 11
None of the three cases actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case
for an end to all animal-using practices and, of an activity such as horse
riding for instance, a classic master/slave relationship, there is no
mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan concentrated on the
areas in which vast numbers of animals are used and/or where
institutionalized cruelties are more readily detectable, and did not set
out to establish in detail the ‘proper’, or ‘better’ constructed behaviour
in regard to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they
establish principles from which we may be able to assume it in most if
not all areas. But although we may extrapolate in order to get a grip on
how we should look upon, say, animal circuses - obviously
unacceptable to Singer, Clark and Regan albeit on different grounds what guidance is there for something as innocuous to the orthodox as
horse riding? 12
It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime
presented and widely perceived as respectable; the combination of
animals and war-victory - the hunting field as a preparation for battle
and the use of animals for human warring purposes; animals considered
as resources; the exercise of power and the domination of ‘nature’; the
animal use=civilization equation; and the hidden stories of slavery
which in different ways lie behind the use of animals - horses ‘broken’,
family groups separated, animals not up to it or beyond it cast off.
Moreover, once broken and separated it is still looked upon as a
kindness to find them ‘work’, to keep them active, a practical example of

Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 1983, (Routledge, London, 1988), pp.349-351.
Singer, Animal Liberation, p.32.
12 This is not to enter into the crass area of objection-query - eg what about locusts,
mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? - in which animal
liberation is commonly bogged down.
10
11
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culture passing itself off as benign nature (welfarism notably obscuring
their confinement in barren fields deprived of cover and denied shelter).
Now horse riding is possibly too complex for preference utilitarianism
to condemn easily and it is not at all clear from Clark's work how it
stands in relation to the ancient virtues of his neo-Platonist earth
household. From Regan’s Case we can get the idea that horse riding may
be anathema to at least rights theory, which can accommodate the
objection, although it is only an informed guess: Regan's ‘not all harms
hurt’ and his dissident reality of ‘animals are not our resources’ are
shown to us in the contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful use. 13
As we have seen them so far then, these philosophies do not actually
spell out what some of them may imply and what they imply could be
spelled out, and especially in a case such as horse riding. Indeed,
precisely because of its ‘innocuity’, a condemnation of horse riding - or
‘riding’ as its practitioners prefer it to be known: again the invisible
animal - may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a
position on virtually every topic within the project could be then
confidently assumed. Perhaps this could help liberate animal liberation
from the confusion or seemingly endless and generally welfarist- (and
therefore bloody culture-) framed, cruelty-abuse-suffering-grounded
debate to which the liberation issue is popularly and politically
relocated and by the terms of which even vivisection and factory
farming can be and are easily defended. 14
Taking the foremost philosophers’ seminal works, we find discrepancies
between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have to look
elsewhere for the kind of consistency 15 we may require and get closer to
a best existing model of and for animal liberation as an abolitionist,
bloodless culture.

Bryant condemns horse riding but from an anti-cruelty perspective, albeit within an
animal ‘rights’ framework. John Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms: An Examination of a
Changing Ethic (J. M. Bryant, Chard, 1982).
14 The liberationist fear may be of abolitionism being too easily equated with
absolutism, ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘extremism’ (as it is by Jasper and Nelkin) or even
‘purism’, a fate from which other abolitionisms and emancipations are saved by the
ability of new rights-holders to negotiate their own ‘working’ roles in society. On that
score, animal liberation is a threat to the work ethic. J. M. Jasper, and D. Nelkin, The
Animal Rights Crusade: The Growth of a Moral Protest (The Free Press, New York, 1992),
p.96, p.178.
15 This is not to question the internal consistency or coherence of the adopted or
adapted philosophies.
13
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Veganism: A Neglected Model
Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed in 1944, and the word
‘vegan’ coined by co-founder and first Secretary Donald Watson, it
issued a Manifesto which included the following aims:
To advocate that man's food should be derived
from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other
wholesome non-animal products and that it should
exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and animals'
milk, butter and cheese.
The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised
how closely the meat and dairy produce industries
are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in
some ways, greater than those of the meat industry
but they are more obscured by ignorance. 16
Further, it was proclaimed in 1951, that:
The object of the Vegan Movement (“to end the
exploitation of animals by man”) is clarified as to
the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which
pledges the Society to “seek to end the use of
animals by man for food, commodities, work,
hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving
exploitation of animal life by man”. By the adoption
of this rule, the Society has clearly come out on the
side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that
we seek, as freedom. Our aim is not to make the
present relationship between man and animal
(which if honestly viewed is mostly one of master
and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish it and
replace it by something more worthy of man’s high
estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures free to return them to the balance and sanity of nature,
which is their rightful place, and so end the historic
wrong perpetrated when man first decided he had
the right to exploit and enslave them. 17
Now this throws up much we could discuss and which many would
criticize - the perhaps primary concern about who ‘Man’ is; the take on a
pure ‘nature’; the appeal to design; and so on (these being characteristic
of the early Vegan Society stance) - but our point is that Leslie Cross
16
17
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went on to claim that this new constitution marked the ‘true birth’ of the
Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the
slavery analogy, this surely is the best available (albeit unparticularized)
statement of intent. Can the master/slave relationship of horse riding be
accommodated here (even if it was beyond the range of contemporary
concern)? Only by preternormal sophistry.
The Society, and vegans in general, had already established and were to
consolidate a practical underpinning to animal liberation, living with
moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm grounding. So, to what
extent do Singer, Clark and Regan build on such codification? The great
anomaly is, as we know, that Singer's Animal Liberation actually
promotes the use of animals. That Singer should, some thirty years after
the Society’s founding, approach the subject of animal liberation in the
following way, is perhaps rather curious, notwithstanding the
reasonable pragmatics - a chapter entitled ‘Becoming a Vegetarian’ 18
rather than ‘Becoming a Vegan’; a toleration of mollusc-eating; 19
promotion of egg-eating, where a welfarist-bloody culture stance is
openly adopted; 20 the use of inverted commas for vegan; the phrase ‘…
some have begun to call themselves vegans’; 21 the adoption, like Salt, of a
‘worst abuses first’ stance; 22 the deliberation over where to draw the line
between killing shrimps and oysters whilst considering the sufferings
(and suffering is Singer's main concern) of the dairy cow and calf as a
lesser issue; 23 and, in a concession to popular rhetoric, the general
depiction of veganism as ‘strict’ and somewhat esoteric. Do Clark and
Regan also keep veganism at arm's length? Clark makes this claim:
What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we
are to mean what we say in outlawing the
unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become,
at the least, vegetarians. 24
With veganism well established - and with the routine chickicide of dayold males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed
slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed (again) by the Vegan
Society - Clark did not feel the need to write instead, ‘we must become,
Singer, Animal Liberation, p.163.
Ibid., p.179.
20 Ibid., p.181; Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 1990, Second edition (Pimilco, London,
1995), pp.175-176.
21 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.179.
22 Ibid., pp.181-182.
23 Ibid.
24 Clark, The Moral Status of Animals, p.45.
18
19
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at the least, vegans’. Although he refers to veganism several times, as a
stage of progression, thus implying as is usual, that veganism is a
material development rather than a cognitive transformation (‘… those
vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism’ he says, for
instance, in his ‘Notes for Proselytes’ after the main body of the work), 25
it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, he does grant
veganism greater credibility and probability: ‘There will be less
suffering in a vegan world, even in a near-vegan world’. 26 But, although
declaring in a footnote that ‘veganism is a better project than lactovegetarianism’, he goes on to say: ‘we may in the end be able to take
some milk from our kin without injustice’. 27 But why this concession to
the purely cultural (whilst the essentialism of ‘meat’-eating is
outlawed)? And is this, along with other backyard images, what Regan
had in mind when he condemned only ‘commercial’ animal agriculture?
There is also Regan's preference for the word ‘vegetarian’ which is used
throughout The Case for Animal Rights. Now it had for long been the
American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the
1940s-50s, to use the word ‘vegetarian’ as all-embracing (and technically
correct it is or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an
American Vegan Society since 1960. So it is reasonable to assume that
Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of commercial animal farming,
was perhaps thinking veganically, reservations about ‘commercial’
notwithstanding. This is supported, for instance, by Regan's later article
with Gary Francione which claims that rights (now seen in vegan terms)
and welfare ideologies are morally incompatible, a tacit understanding
of bloody and bloodless cultures. 28 Nevertheless, ‘vegan’ was not used
ten years earlier in the major work which came partly as a response to
Singer, who differentiated between vegetarians and vegans.
Is Regan's whole effect warped by not using the word ‘vegan’? Not
using it can lead not least to problems of both spatial and intellectual
comprehension as any vegan, considered to be ‘a vegetarian’, has found
in hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private home.
The implications are far-reaching, for by it, both here and in Singer and
Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights theory and indeed
with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can regularly read
about celebrities and others being described as ‘vegetarians’ only to find
Ibid., p.213.
Ibid., p.80.
27 Ibid., p.185.
28 Tom Regan and Gary Francione, ‘A Movement's Means Create its Ends’, The Vegan,
(Winter, 1993). First published in The Animals' Agenda, (January-February, 1992).
25
26
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that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast,
constitute a clear and unequivocal statement (or do so when not
clouded by vegetarianism).
Vegetarianism's milky dilutions would appear not only to weaken the
vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle but also fail to loosen
sufficiently
orthodoxy’s
long
established
meanings
of
human/nonhuman relations and definitions of animal liberation. There
can still be detected an accommodating vagueness (and tactical
tortuousness) which only disappears with veganism’s clearing away of
shams, fictions and concealments, its lack of concession to orthodox
ontology and, see Adams 1994, its determining epistemology. 29 There is
a world (or world-view) of difference between vegetarianism and
veganism. It's a culture thing, as we shall see.

A Repeated Anomaly
The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. For
whatever reasons or motives (and there is an obvious tension between
ethics and tactics), veganism was not or appeared not to be the
philosophers’ alpha (leaving aside pre-verbal mappings) and omega in
the 1970s and '80s. This had happened before: it is a repeated anomaly.
In 1892, Henry Salt had claimed in Animals' Rights that assertions of one
form of animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other,
were ‘irrelevant’ 30 whilst at the same time advocating egg-eating, milkdrinking and wool-wearing. 31 What places Salt, like Singer, Clark and
Regan it would seem, within the increasingly identifiable area of bloody
and bloodless culture tension are comments which can be juxtaposed
thus:
It is little use to claim ‘rights’ for animals in a vague
general way, if with the same breath we explicitly
show our determination to subordinate those rights
to anything and everything that can be construed
into a human ‘want’. 32

Carol J. Adams, ‘Beastly Theology: When Epistemology Creates Ontology’ in her
Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals (Continuum, New York,
1994).
30 Henry S. Salt, Animals' Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress, 1892 (Centaur
Press, Fontwell, 1980), p.106.
31 e.g. Ibid., p.43; Henry S. Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism: Essays and Dialogues (London
Vegetarian Society, London, nd (1899)), pp.35-38.
32 Salt, Animal Rights Considered, p.9.
29
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And, perhaps out of a narrow focus on normative cruelty:
What I say will of course have no reference to wool,
or any other substance which is obtainable without
injury to the animal from which it is taken. 33
For Salt, who considered the question of whether man is morally
justified in utilizing animal labour at all as ‘abstruse’, 34 animals were still
resources. Further:
I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary
contention that man is not morally justified in
imposing any sort of subjection on the lower
animals. 35
He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some
seventy years earlier, had written:
at least in the present state of society it is unjust,
and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer
from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use
them, and to encourage their being placed in his
power. 36
Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the ‘rights’
of women, blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral
Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes in 1824, a work whose
strategic and tactical approaches are reversed by Singer:
in our present speciesist world, it is not easy to keep
so strictly to what is morally right [i.e. not using
dairy products]. 37
We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some have claimed,
that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out a lot
of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being
more of an uncertain inclination, outlined most of what was to follow,
and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, animals' personal
identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause of
Ibid., p.79
Ibid., p.43.
35 Ibid., p.33.
36 Cited in Ibid.
37 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.181.
33
34
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what was moral and just, Gompertz was, like some others6, 38 a vegan
long before the word was coined, dispensing with wool, leather, silk
and eggs and refusing to ride in a horse-drawn carriage. Much of Moral
Inquiries is taken up in the form of subversionary ‘arguments’ (with
Gompertz as Z):
Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk;
what harm can there be in that?
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for
man.
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is
then a kindness to relieve her of her milk.
Z: But the calf should not be taken away. 39
For both Salt and the philosophers to fall short of overt endorsement of
Gompertz and veganism also means not capitalizing on the substantive
shift of his revelatory light which, aptly, he shines on horses. His
concern with the way they were treated appears foremost in his work
but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, ‘How can man do
without the aid of horses?’, Gompertz's reply is, ‘That is his business to
find out’, 40 perhaps a typical response from one famed also for a
catalogue of technological inventions. He goes on:
It is true that we have adopted the method of
employing horses to perform our labour, by which
we have most probably only chosen one method
out of a great many, and we have remained
contented with it … What causes you to think the
services of horses so important to man is, that you
take things as they are; horses being used…. 41
What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering
of horses when most others could not see it (which was Salt's concern),
but that animals, horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn't
Salt's concern, until later). 42 Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal

One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal
Green in 1680 (see The Vegan, Summer, 1997, p.25) but, as early as 3BC, Porphyry and
Claudius Neapolitan wrangled over dispensing with all animal products.
39 Lewis Gompertz, Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and Brutes, 1824 (Centaur
Press, Fontwell, 1992), p.97.
40 Ibid., p.122.
41 Ibid., pp.123-125.
42 Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's angle: ‘a civilized posterity will shudder at
the sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion’. Henry S. Salt,
Seventy Years Among Savages (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1921), p.217.
38
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use naturalism and inevitability and, in the milk argument above, of
bloody culture's tender mercies.
Regardless of the philosophical position or other grounding, and of
interim tactical considerations, espousing animal liberation without
affirming and valorizing veganism - as both theoretical starting point
and practical aim - when the model(s) already exist, takes animal
liberation’s eyes off the prize. Whether Regan and Clark are promoting
veganism or not, it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and
seventy years after Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory
stance of animal liberationists. Indeed, the recoil, if that's what it is,
seems endemic. As Leah Leneman has shown us, the vigorous
correspondence during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society's journal The
Vegetarian Messenger and Health Review had led to the conclusion that the
defence of the use of eggs and milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory
and that the only ‘true way’ was to ‘live on cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and
vegetables’. 43 Nevertheless, in what was becoming a familiar pattern,
this was reversed in the decades that followed.
The immediate or ultimate disdain, marginalization or even total
exclusion have also been contagious, and across the spectrum. Robert
Garner's strategy-minded work, for instance, talks of the vegetarian and
vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end animal
cruelty ‘which for them involves the end of the meat industry’ (no
mention of dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society
from its listing of the other three organizations which formed the Great
British MeatOut coalition in the late 1980s. 44 The ‘manifesto’ edited by
Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris had few references to veganism 45
which is at best a subtext in the review-and-recommend essays of the
Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate. 46 Richard D Ryder's
chronicle 47 and (notably from ‘outside’ of animal liberation) Keith
Tester's new historicist exaggerations 48 merely acknowledge veganism,
Leah Leneman, ‘Britain's First Vegans?’, The Vegan, (Winter, 1997); Leah Leneman,
‘No Animal Food: The Road to Veganism in Britain, 1909-1944’, Society and Animals,
7/3, (1999), pp.219-228.
44 Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Morality (Manchester University Press,
Manchester, 1993), p.39, p.186.
45 Ruth Harrison, ‘On Factory Farming’ in R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch, and J. Harris
(eds), Animals, Men and Morals: An Enquiry into the Maltreatment of Non-humans
(Gollancz, London, 1971), p.23.
46 Robert Garner (ed), Animal Rights: The Changing Debate (Routledge, London, 1996).
47 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989).
48 Keith Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (Routledge, London,
1991).
43
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give the briefest of descriptions and fail to record the foundation or
existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a critique of
Bryant for whom, almost uniquely, veganism is de rigueur within
‘animal rights’. 49 Ted Benton's eco-socialism, which identifies rights
theory with an opposition to 'animal agriculture', nevertheless equates it
with vegetarianism (thus following the Regan confusion) and not
veganism which, again, is Cinderella'd in favour of a ‘high welfare’
model. 50 And philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen 51 still refer to
Gompertz as a vegetarian (Singer refers to him as a ‘strict’ vegetarian 52)
and, like Singer, use inverted commas for their reference to vegans. Eder
too, in referring to animal liberation never mentions veganism and,
although his ‘vegetarian culture’ is seen in terms of negating social
order, lacto-ovo-vegetarianism maintains hierarchies in terms of the
primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative magic of complex
food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets. 53 Indeed, for
virtually all the popular and academic literature on or referring to
animal liberation, vegetarianism rather than veganism is the common
coin.
Moreover, that Donald Watson and Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel 54
and Wynne-Tyson, 55 the two works which represent the movement's
most comprehensive and specific archaeologies of pro-animal thought,
would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition
and authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed valueleaders. 56

Bryant, Fettered Kingdoms
Ted Benton, Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights and Social Justice (Verso,
London, 1993).
51 L. Finsen and S. Finsen, The Animal Rights Movement in America: From Compassion to
Respect (Twayne, New York, 1994), p.284, p.155.
52 Singer, Animal Liberation, p.244; Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11.
53 Eder, The Social Construction of Nature.
54 Charles R. Magel, Keyguide to Information Sources in Animal Rights (Mansell, London,
1989).
55 Jon Wynne-Tyson (ed), The Extended Circle: An Anthology of Humane Thought, 1985
(Cardinal, London, 1990).
56 Nonetheless, the value of Wynne-Tyson's work here resides not least in illustrating
how animal concern has been edited out by mainstream collections, eg the Oxford
Dictionary of Quotations. In further defence of Wynne-Tyson we should acknowledge
his largely overlooked comment on veganism in Food for a Future: ‘The logic of the
vegan case is absolute. No one - whether nutritionist, physician, sociologist or layman can rebut the veganic argument in any important respect. Veganism is part of the most
truly civilised concept of life of which the human mind has been capable’. Jon WynneTyson, Food for a Future: The Complete Case for Vegetarianism, 1975 (Centaur Press,
Fontwell, 1979), p.107
49
50
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However, there appears to have been a latterday shift towards the
vegan nexus by some. In several of the campaigning magazines one
notices at the turn of the millennium - as with Regan and Francione - a
growing emphasis on veganism in, for instance, the promotion of vegan
food items and the publication of vegan rather than vegetarian recipes.
And some hitherto hidden agendas have now been willingly revealed.
Yet it has all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and
Cross, indeed with those of Gompertz.
The delay has served to render animal liberation somewhat confusing
and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement)
and therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now, the
Vegetarian Society actively promotes animal products. And, possibly for
tactical reasons, many of the (now mainly vegan-staffed) organizations
do still tend to promote by name the more ‘user-friendly’ option of
vegetarianism, and anti-vivisection organizations have promoted
‘cruelty-free’ products containing animal ingredients (thus failing to
redefine cruelty). Moreover, throughout the 1990s, there seems to have
been an increasing association of vegetarianism with ‘animal rights’
through female vegetarian-welfarist celebrities, which may sustain the
old derogatory representation of sentimental animal concern.
Although there are other factors involved, such as which foods are
‘male’ and which ‘female’ and which are essentialisms and which
culturalisms, and all the tactical decisions which will flow from such
considerations, this has much to do with the ‘worst abuses first’ stance. 57
What is 'worst' is not only arbitrarily decided but appears to depend on
the extent of one's empirical knowledge of animal use (witness Singer's
laudable volte-face on wool after reading Townend). 58 The movement
seems to have set in stone the construction that ‘meat’-eating is worse
than other forms of animal consumption, establishing a hierarchical
scale to be negotiated as one finds out more, even though knowledge of
the stories behind all animal products is more readily available now
than it was in 1892, or even in 1975 (despite the Vegan Society making
available such information for years prior to then and Singer, like Salt,
had read Gompertz before laying out his ethics). 59 Indeed, submitting to
Salt's own ‘worst abuses first’ approach to ‘extreme vegetarianism’ displays a greater
anticipation of veganism in his later The Logic of Vegetarianism. See George Hendrick
and Willene Hendrick, The Savour of Salt: A Henry Salt Anthology (Centaur Press,
Fontwell, 1989), p.27. The particular passage was omitted from the London Vegetarian
Society's revised and abridged edition (Salt, The Logic of Vegetarianism)
58 Singer, Animal Liberation cf Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed.; Christine Townsend,
Pulling the Wool (Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1985).
59 Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd ed., p.11.
57
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this, the Vegan Society is today reduced to specifically targeting
vegetarians rather than the general public(s), and the UK has still not
seen concerted anti-animal milk, anti-egg or anti-wool campaigns.
(Perhaps there is a linguistic problem: does the inability to name the
non-milk-egg-wool-using meat-eater preclude the stance and therefore
bar that road? But, conversely, if to be named is to be controlled, maybe
here is a seditious advantage to be seized).

Rebuking Vegetarianism
Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with
'animal rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal
use is welfarist, bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. Carol J
Adams offers us the notion of ‘the vegetarian quest’, the first step of
which is
experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat
as an item of food…which arises because one sees
that it comes from … someone, and it has been
made into … no-body. The revelation involves
recognizing the structure of the absent referent. 60
The second step is naming the relationships, eg the connection between
meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense that animals
have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the
recognition of the violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity
between meat eating and war. This stage also enables the reclaiming of
appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and misnaming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that
an alternative to meat-eating exists and that it works; ‘vegetarians…
seek to change the meat eating world’. 61
It is the second and third steps in which we are interested here.
Regarding the possibility of the second - remembering why the Society
had been formed in 1944 while war was still raging, Donald Watson
wrote the following (as Leneman 62 1999 has reminded us):
Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it
seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening
Carol J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory
(Polity Press, London, 1990), pp.175-179.
61 Ibid.
62 Leneman, ‘No Animal Food’.
60
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experience of the War, and a reminder that we
should be doing more about the other holocaust
that goes on all the time. 63
But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating
world. Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked
the non-vegan vegetarian world: it was to be demonstrated that veganism
works. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between
warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt, 64), it was the effect of the
second war which, for some, took the process across to re-connect with
Gompertz's vision.
Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only
identifies bloody culture rationalism’s nadir but also expands the war
‘front’ (another of Adams’ notions 65) to recognize not just all animals but
all animal products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw
earlier, all animal use. But Watson goes on, and in the process both
disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world creation myth - the
Egyptian Pyramid Texts’ cultural-need depiction of the pharaoh
suckling from the cow mother of humankind - and reverses the values
of sacred and profane:
though nature provides us with lots of examples of
carnivores and vegetarians it provides us with no
examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians.
Such groups are freaks and only made possible by
man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions
of other species. This, we thought, could not be
right either dietetically or ethically. It was certainly
wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no

63 Donald Watson, ‘Out of the Past’, The Vegan, (Summer, 1988). Watson had also
grasped what Salt seems to have suspected already at the turn of the century: that the
virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century evolutionary concepts
shifted into an unspecific ‘social change’ in the twentieth; that the idea of united,
comprehensive progress was replaced by an understanding of uneven and partial
change, different aspects of society falling out of step with each other (notably the
animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced – one couldn't
wait for inevitability or for the ripe time. See Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1994), p.184. In the light of this - and Watson had dealt with the
‘delaying tactic’: ‘There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to
posterity, for posterity may not have our ideals’ - we could ask what ‘the plan’ is. To
wait until an as yet unspecified percentage of the population is vegetarian before
veganism dare become the name of the game? Donald Watson The Vegan News, 1,
(November, 1994).
64 Salt, Seventy Years Among Savages, pp.219-230.
65 Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat, pp.120-141.
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spectacle more bizarre than that of a grown man
attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow. 66
Now, if humans have gone from being pre-hunt, pre-ethical vegan to
being animal eaters and then, only with the neolithic revolution, to fullblown lacto-ovo-carnivorism then, in this sense, lacto-ovovegetarianism is firmly rooted in animal-based agriculture: it is animalusing culture’s freakish form of veganism just as the animals used have
been turned into freakish Forms.
We need to re-assess the two culture concept, as it appears that we now
have two different versions. One, extending Eder’s thesis, would
perhaps place veganism as the fuller development of bloodless culture.
However, if we take our lead from the vegan exemplars, we can suggest
that veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is
bloodless culture, 67 wherever it originates: most plausibly perhaps in an
innate alternative potential of both individual and society. We cannot
suggest that Watson and Cross are claiming any of this, but we can
suggest that they are, in their turn, discovering and connecting with
bloodless culture as that very option, one which has been consistently
rejected and obscured since the time of cultivation and domestication,
efforts being made ever since to reconnect with the primal sympathy.
Eder’s bloodless culture starting point in Judaism can be seen as just one
effort, and the vegan Eden of the troubled writers of Genesis, torn again
between two cultures, may have been another.
Our entire history can be seen in this light. 68 Most of history's ‘bloodless
culture’ representatives - including the famous anti-cruelty foxhunters
and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists - have been in some half-way
house, trying to reach out to a bloodless culture ideal but pulled back by
the internalized values of bloody culture, the numbing and blinding
Watson, ‘Out of the Past’.
Of course, for humans at least, there is probably no such thing as truly bloodless
culture: it remains an ideal, probably an unattainable one. But, rather than using
unavoidable bloodletting - eg in the tilling of soil or in defence - as the premiss from
which to exploit, veganism is surely bloodless culture in its original and continuing
intent, in its deliberate non-use. It is the bloodless culture of which we know humans to
be capable. (Gompertz's own suggestion that we might eat animals which died of
natural causes seems to have been inspired by the belief he was encouraged to hold:
that his health would suffer without animal products, a familiar story in 1944 and even
at the turn of the millennium: bloodless culture spells anaemia for the orthodox).
68 And no less than in the equally valid light of ‘The history of all hitherto existing
society is the history of the struggle between humans and non-humans’. John Simons,
‘The Longest Revolution: Cultural Studies after Speciesism’, Environmental Values, 6,
(1997), p.484.
66
67
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comforts of its cosmology(ies), and the entirely practical impossibilities
which no longer obtain in the Western world.
Vegetarianism itself, seemingly a product of bloody culture, is a cultural
ersatz, and appropriation. It may be a ‘further step’ from today's
vegetarianism to veganism but on a lateral, cross-culture (cognitive)
route, not on a vertical, intra-culture (material) one. Not so much a
development or Ederian evolution as an abandonment of one culture for
another. 69 In a remarkable testimony proving that conscience is an
indispensable factor in the best scientific equation Watson and Cross,
like Gompertz and others, in much doubt due to orthodoxy's command
of nutritional knowledge, put bloodless culture in sharper perspective,
liberated from the eternalization of animal use, from the mythology of
the animal-product dietary and from the power-based ambivalence of
human/nonhuman relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism.
And this has many implications, not least of which are for the
effectiveness of the movement's oppositional discourse and its
strategic/tactical dilemmas - which ends are dictating which means, or
vice versa, as the movement shifts, in part, from protest to public policy
activity 70 - and for normative perceptions and ideological
representations of animal liberation, many of which picture it as an
extreme of orthodoxy, eg an overidentification with animals, thus of
course validating the centre of animal-use, using the ALF as a political
synecdoche (strategy and representation having influenced the
philosophies in the first place). The equating of animal liberation with
vegetarianism affords the extreme label a certain legitimacy, for
vegetarianism seems to reside at bloody culture's refined periphery, at
its opposite pole to the raw bloody culture of, for example, hunting,
Roman and Renaissance periods. (Thus circumscribed it remains, albeit
idiosyncratically, within the realm of private lifestyle-menu options.
And this relates too to Tester's ability to entrap ‘animal rights’ within
the realm of bloody culture's anthropocentric ‘entrapment’ of animals).
But it would be illegitimate to view and represent veganism-animal
If there is a sense of development or evolution of bloodless culture it would be,
perhaps, to fruitarianism but how practicable that would be for whole societies has yet
to be shown, as have hitherto vague notions of non-exploitative symbiotic humannonhuman relations.
70 The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally
advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a
'state of the cause' comment by Singer himself: ‘What disturbs me is the fact that the
thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals - in other words, for equal
consideration of the interests of animals - keeps getting sidetracked into small
increments of progress in animal welfare’. Peter Singer, Interview in Outrage,
(June/July, 1993).
69
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liberation as an extreme rather than as, together, a genuine alternative
culture, civilization and civilizing process, one which is not defined and
shaped by invisible and ‘lesser’ slaveries. 71
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None of the foregoing has meant to suggest of course that veganism is itself a
strategy.
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